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Constitutional Sentiments 
 
Abstract. The principal claim of the essay is that sentiments and assumptions about senti-
ments 
– have an important role in setting up constitutional designs and interpretation (“evolving 
standards of decency”); 
– constitutional arrangements do have impacts on social emotions; 
– the disregard of the interrelation of emotions and other forms of cognition condemns 
legal theory to one-sidedness and the efforts of behavioral economics seem not to undo this 
one-sidedness. 
 For example, fear is present in the making of many constitutions. Constitutions are 
designed to give assurances against fear that stems from, among others, pre-constitutional 
oppression, mob rule and factional passions. Constitutional rights are also structured by 
emotions: Compassion and indignation serve as emotional grounds to accept and claim 
human rights.  
 A simplified vision of modernity claims that law and constitutional design is all about 
rationality. Brain imaging studies indicate that moral emotions guide many moral judgments or 
are in competition with reasoning processes. Of course, moral emotions contribute to the 
shaping of law through moral judgments. To the extent law intends to shape behavior, it will 
rely on its legal folk psychology. A theory of constitutional sentiments shall reconstruct 
the assumptions on human nature as emotional nature that shape the constitution and its 
interpretation. 
 Historically, constitutional path dependence presupposes emotional choices and emotional 
action tendencies that are institutionalized and ‘imposed’ on law and society. Paradigmatic 
changes in constitutional law cannot be explained without considering the path-breaking rule 
of emotions. For example, the commitment to abolish slavery cannot be explained without the 
emotional condemnation (based on disgust and resulting in indignation) of the institution. The 
ban on torture is also rooted in sentiments of disgust. Concepts of cruel and unusual punish-
ment are rooted in emotions of disgust. Law is both trying to script emotions (in order to 
prevent challenges to the status quo) and accommodates prevailing (or preferred) emotions 
(hence the difficulty of a non-revenge based criminal policy). 
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And it is fortunate for men to be in a situation in which, 
 though their passions may prompt them to be wicked, 
 they have nevertheless an interest in not being so. 
 Montesquieu 
 
 
It is not obvious that sentiments and assumptions about sentiments are crucial 
in setting up constitutional design or that constitutional arrangements have 
impacts on social emotions. To show that such relations are important I could 
use the genuine indignation that women’s rights triggered in Afghanistan among 
the faithful, but I prefer to discuss fear, empathy, and compassion in democratic 
constitutional contexts to illustrate the role of sentiments in limiting govern-
ment power and in accepting or rejecting certain fundamental rights. This 
will be followed by an analysis of political emotionalism and irrational risk 
handling that challenge the institutional design of liberal democracy.  
 A discussion of the role of emotions in constitutional law and political 
institution design presents methodological difficulties as well as challenges 
related to the conflicting scientific knowledge that is generated regarding 
emotions. The methodological problem is this: emotions are individual empirical 
phenomena, even if occurring in a social environment in social interaction. 
Institutions, on the other hand, are collective normative expectations and patterns, 
or symbols, or what not.  
 Strictly speaking, one can speak about emotions that might have existed in 
individuals who designed institutions. More importantly, in the making of a 
constitution, constitution makers have assumptions about human emotions. But 
these are hardly measurable. Is it relevant in the creation of institutions what 
the related actual individual emotional processes are? How do we observe or 
reconstruct such emotions? After all, it is quite possible that the constitutional 
design is the work of a small drafting elite’s false consciousness about emotions. 
It might be the false assumption of judges who redesign the constitution. The 
assumptions on emotions might be wrong: nevertheless the constitution will be 
operative. But at what price? 
 My research hypothesis is that emotions, through complicated mechanisms, do 
have an actual impact on constitutional design. By improving our knowledge 
regarding emotions, we can improve constitutional design.  
 Such research has to consider many interrelated matters: first, it is about 
the impact of sentiments and assumptions regarding emotions on constitutional 
law; secondly, it is about the effort of constitutional law to handle and shape 
public sentiments; thirdly, it considers the public reactions, including emotional 
reactions, to constitutional arrangements; and finally, it is about the actual 
impact of constitutional and other legal designs on the social construction and 
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use of sentiments. Consideration of these matters will enable the discussion of 
policy issues of how to deal with emotions.  
 I am not offering any definition of emotions in the constitutional context. 
Instead, I use the 18th century term sentiment to indicate that in constitutional 
design what matters is the assumption about social emotions. Sentiments refer 
to prevailing language usage regarding the social interpretation of behavior and 
related expectations. I hope that in the long run a closer relationship between 
sentiments, which serve as social-normative shorthand in constitutional and 
political reasoning, and emotions, understood here in a scientific, e.g. 
neurological sense, can be developed.  
 The term constitution is used here in a broad sense. It goes beyond consti-
tutional texts and includes various judicial and other legally and socially relevant 
meanings, constitutional conventions, practices and customs that emerge in the 
use of public power. On the other hand, I limit myself to constitutional settings 
that emerge under the paradigm of constitutionalism. Here constitutionalism 
entails democracy and 19th century liberalism. I understand constitutionalism 
as a crucial part of the reason-based modernity project, something that became 
quite problematic recently, because of, among other things, the mistreatment of 
emotions in favor of distorted reason.  
  It is true that in a desiccated tradition political institutions claim legitimacy 
precisely because they are able to operate rationally, hence efficiently. They 
claim to deserve respect and obedience because these constitutional institutions 
enable rational behavior in society. Contemporary constitutional systems are 
typically presented as if they were operating according to rationality, or at least 
as if their problems were related to some problem of bounded rationality, some 
difficulty in intellectual processing. All the above is in line with the centrality 
of reason, the alleged core assumption of modernity. Today people take pride 
in debasing reason-based modernity. At a time when reason is suspicious, 
constitutions join the usual suspects in the academic round up. But the reason-
passion opposition is a gross simplification: the goal of the enlightenment was 
not the oppression of sentiments, but self-control that enables propriety in the 
display of sentiments. The enemy of reason is not passion; it is fanaticism. 
This message of Voltaire is to be remembered in our age of new fanaticism. 
 Constitutionalism and the administration of justice are often presented as 
institutions that claim to improve efficiency in human affairs by promising the 
eradication of emotion from the constitutional public sphere. Notwithstanding 
the relevance of sentiments for constitutionalism, constitutional law allegedly 
neglects this relevance. Why is that so? There is a historical path dependence 
here. The paradigm of fundamental rights is provided to the modern world by 
the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. The Declaration 
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offered a rationalistic frame and this is what became prevalent in constitutional 
thinking. But it would be wrong to consider the Declaration to be a pure 
negation of sentiments and an example of the modernist plot of enlightened 
reason. The French revolution was a sentimental revolution.  
 Let me quote the Marquis de La Fayette arguing at the National Assembly in 
favor of the Declaration: “Let me call to mind the sentiments which Nature has 
engraved in the heart of every citizen, and which take a new force when they are 
solemnly recognized by all: For a nation to love liberty, it is sufficient that she 
knows it; and to be free, it is sufficient that she wills it.”1 In this approach, liberty 
exists in natural sentiments and reason is only there to remind us of our senti-
ments. It is only the result of positivist science and legal positivism that moral 
sentiments are pushed into oblivion in scholarship and positivist ideology.  
 While in the Middle Ages behavior was taken to be shaped by certain 
passions, this was gradually replaced by conceptions of interest as the proper 
source of guidance for and basis of explanation of social behavior. It should be 
added that the 18th century cult of sentiments is related to the attempt to use 
them as a crucial technique of social control under Louis XIV. The technique 
faded away in favor of scientific positivism, but it seems to me that it is back 
in the culture of narcissism. In a culture of narcissism, rational arguments are 
replaced by narratives of suffering that are amplified in the hope of manufac-
turing indignation and compassion. 
 The dismissal of passions did not result in the annihilation of sentiments in 
some socially construed and institutionalized quarantine of mental asylums, poor 
houses, educational institutions, and correct manners, as one could conclude 
from a superficial reading of Foucault. It is only in the positivism of the 19th 
century that sentiments are neglected in political thinking and in law, with 
some exceptions like crimes of passion.  
 Among many others, Hume, Adam Smith, and Rousseau have emphasized 
that sentiments are constitutive to social institutions. Rousseau’s crucial senti-
ment in this regard is pity and related empathy or, as it was called, sympathy. 
It is through sympathy, Edmund Burke wrote, "that we enter into the concerns 
of others; that we are moved as they are moved, and are never suffered to be 
indifferent spectators of almost any thing which men can do or suffer.”2 
 The simplest reference to the foundational tenets of constitutionalism that 
prevailed in the 18th century will suffice to prove that modern constitutional 
design, although it is a rational venture, is intended to handle human sentiments, 
  
 1 Quoted in Paine, T.: The Rights of Man. Hormondsworth, 1792. 
 2 Burke, E.: A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origins of Our Ideas of the Sublime 
and Beautiful. Oxford, New York, 1757. Section XIII. 
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even beyond constraining passion. True, constitutions are silent about senti-
ments, and modern law is to a great extent a set of decisional norms that tends to 
create barriers to the operation of emotions in legal and judicial decisions. But 
silence is not the sign of indifference. On the contrary, it disguises preoccupation. 
 As proof of this claim, let us quote Madison: 
 
“AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, 
none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break 
and control the violence of faction. […] By a faction, I understand a number 
of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who 
are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, 
adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate 
interests of the community. [Factions bring] instability, injustice, and 
confusion introduced into the public councils [that is, they destroy rational 
deliberation]. In particular this is the source of the tyranny of the majority.”3 
 
In Madison’s view the problem is solved by representative government, sepa-
ration of powers, and federalism. These institutions do not allow people to have 
their passions directly operate. This way “the [passionate] majority must be 
rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into 
effect schemes of oppression.”4 
 Please note that the constitutional plan is not about the prevention of the 
emotionally driven irrationality of factional thinking and action. These cannot 
be prevented. There is no place for pedagogical optimism here. Madison offers 
a purely rational design that limits the success of irrational mass movements 
and the irrationality of all monopolies. Further, Madison, following Montesquieu, 
attributes emotions to the constitutional bodies:  
 
“[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers 
in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each 
department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist 
encroachments of the others. […] Ambition must be made to counteract 
ambition. […] It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices 
should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is 
government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If 
men were angels, no government would be necessary.”5  
  
 3 Madison, J.: The Federalist, 1787. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Madison, J.: The Federalist, 1788. 
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Constitutions cannot annihilate sentiments. More importantly, they do not intend 
to do so. Constitutional law is not about the annihilation or disregard of moral 
sentiments; it is about the manipulation of sentiments. It offers mechanisms to 
cool down passions that endanger the constitutional system. (This, of course, 
includes oppressive mechanisms that serve the maintenance of the political 
status quo.) Constitutional pre-commitments, the difficulty of constitutional 
amendment, gag rules, etc., are some examples of such mechanisms. Sentiments 
might result in social instability: institutions offer solidarity and permanence 
and these become more and more important to the constitutional designer. 
“The dead weight of institutions, which have a life of their own, then gradually 
tames the impetus” of the original sentiments.6  
 It is not by accident that the victorious politics of emotions often pushes for 
constitutional reform or a new constitution. Constitutions are often replaced in 
very emotional social processes. In 1958 General de Gaulle decided to 
disregard the existing rules of constitutional amendment that were available to 
him and preferred to have a new constitution of France via plebiscite. De 
Gaulle’s gamble was to generate emotional support for his constitution by 
generating personal sympathy towards his rule.  
 Collective political sentiments are decisive in constitutional design. More 
precisely, fear is one of the crucial social experiences that dictate specific 
fundamental constitutional solutions. Fear was important in shaping Madison’s 
plan, but here I am referring to a collective emotional experience as the creative 
force shaping the constitution. The 1789 French Declaration, many of the 
solutions that were accepted at Philadelphia in 1787, and the German Basic 
law after WWII were all clearly dictated by considerations of fear. Indeed, fear 
helped to overcome collective and individual resistance to certain solutions.  
 In July 1789, the French Constituent Assembly was in the middle of a bitter 
debate about the meaning of the rights of man. Quite a remarkable treat, given 
that the matter was declared to be obvious in the light of reason. It was hotly 
debated, for example, if free exercise of religion would be extended to Protestants. 
It was only thanks to a most emotional speech of a pastor that the Assembly 
considered reason to favor a more equitable position. At the end of July an 
epidemic of hatred raged through the villages of France. Within a fortnight, 
French peasants successfully burned the documents containing feudal privileges 
together with the castles where the documents were held. When the news 
reached the Assembly on the night of August 4, the debate on the Declaration 
came to a sudden halt and in an all-night session the panicked delegates of the 
Assembly one after another voluntarily renounced their feudal privileges, as if 
  
 6 Canetti, E.: Crowds and Power. New York, 1984. 24. 
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subject to a miraculous act of reason. Two weeks later the abolition of feudal 
privileges was proclaimed by the National Assembly. A couple of days later, 
and without much additional debate, a list of fundamental rights was adopted, 
without the catalogue ever having been finished.  
 The works of fear generated by the Shays rebellion and the Philadelphia 
mob rule (or call it premature democracy) had their obvious impact on the US 
Constitution. The American and the 1948 German Constitutions do not allow 
for referenda, because of fear of irrational mob reactions. Other constitutions 
considerably limit the subject matter of referenda. Fear resulting from past 
injustice is expressly present in the German and South African Constitutions, 
and in other post-totalitarian constitutions (see prohibition on totalitarian 
political organizations, the right to resist, etc.)  
 While the impact of a fearful consideration of the past is undeniable, the 
methodological problem remains. How did these considerations make their 
way into the constitution, and how do these considerations influence future 
constitutional developments? To what extent do these considerations, which are 
the reconstruction of emotions and shorthand for the scholarly observer, have 
real emotional equivalents? Were the drafters actually afraid? Did they feel 
fear? Did they assume that people or at least their constituency were afraid and 
expected them to alleviate that fear by institutional design that promises 
safety? Does it matter? Assuming that the small elite that actually drafted the 
constitution shared the public fear, or a group dynamics of fear did play a role 
in the negotiations, is this to say that the constitution actually expresses and 
radiates social fear? 
 Fundamental rights offer a second illustration of the relationship that exists 
between constitutional institutions and moral sentiments. Rights are hard to 
deny when they meet emotional resonance.  
 Torture is rejected because other people’s suffering triggers disgust and 
compassion. But torture is culture dependent. The ancestors of the same French-
men who today abhor the death penalty took pleasure in the brutal execution of 
the regicide Damiens in 1757 when he was torn in pieces by horses. By the way, 
Adam Smith was working on the manuscript of his Theory of Moral Senti-
ments that very year. He claims that other people’s pain is felt as one’s own 
through mechanisms of empathy. I assume that empathy does play a role in the 
contemporary success of socio-economic rights claims, and in humanitarian 
intervention. In a more troubling way, as Nietzsche has indicated, ressentiment, 
this strange marriage of bad consciousness and envy, plays an enormous role here.  
 To use a different example, altruism urges us, not always with success, to 
give alms, although we have quite rational strategies to avoid the good deeds of 
the heart. Social welfare is justified in the eyes of the compassionate, although 
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the socially decisive factor is to whom we feel compassion. (See the social war 
on the construction of the deserving poor.) Given these sentiments, it becomes 
difficult to attack welfare policies. The acceptance of anti-welfare reasons has 
to overcome personal emotional resistance.  
 It has to be emphasized that under ordinary circumstances empathy and 
resulting solidarity feelings as such do not result in action. The compassion is 
without a specific object of action and its importance is primarily to facilitate 
the operation of reason, or to offer a predisposition for collective action. How 
this collective action is structured, and what are its norms and objectives, 
cannot be decided on the basis of moral sentiments. Social representations will 
determine with whom and how one should feel solidarity and compassion. 
Gertrude Himmelfarb describes the difficulty of compassion-triggered action: 
 
“In its sentimental mode, compassion is an exercise in moral indignation, 
in feeling good rather than doing good; this mode recognizes no principle 
of proportion, because feeling, unlike reason, knows no proportion, no limit, 
no respect for the constraints of policy or prudence. In its unsentimental 
mode, compassion seeks above all to do good, and this requires a stern 
sense of proportion, of reason and selfcontrol.”7  
 
There is a long way to go from compassion to social rights, and this is not a 
one-way street. Changes in the social patterns mobilizing compassion might 
result in the reversal of legal arrangements. The object of empathy, like other 
emotional objects, is determined, at least according to sociological and pheno-
menological theories of emotion, in the Lebenswelt. 
 Compassion today plays a contradictory role. As Marco Steenbergen states: 
“On first sight there indeed appears to be ‘compassion fatigue’ (Kozol 1995) in 
American society including the prevailing social indifference in face of the 
dismantling of the social safety net. [… But] Americans talk individualism but 
often behave in the spirit of compassion.”8 Already Tocqueville noted that 
Americans were quite willing to offer assistance to those in need, in spite of 
their emphasis on the norm of self-reliance.  
 This is not to suggest that sentiments can explain constitutional change. 
Abolitionism was not the result of a sudden compassion epidemic: it was the 
result of long-term processes (including economic processes) with group dynamics 
  
 7 Himmelfarb, G.: Poverty and Compassion: The Moral Imagination of the Late 
Victorians. New York, 1991. 5. 
 8 Steenbergen, S.: Compassion & American Public Opinion: An Analysis of the 
NES Humanitarian Scale. NES Pilot Study Report, (1996), 1–2. 
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that sped up certain cognitive changes that then enabled the re-framing of 
slaves as being humans. At this historical point, keeping them in slavery met 
indignation. On the other hand, constitutionalizing the dictates of sentiments 
helps to sustain and extend the cultural environment that provides interpretive 
schemes to sentiments, or, if emotions are cognition dependent, it may shape 
the emotions. Social sentiments become normative patterns through constitu-
tionalisation. The constitutional solution, be it in the text of the constitution or 
in a judicial decision that embodies rights, finds echo in the public sentiment. 
The best-case scenario is that the constitution meets with constitutional 
enthusiasm: the constitution offers values for public identification. Constitutions 
are often acts of nation and state formation and the reception of the constitu-
tion, or its rejection, is part of identity formation. Such identification increases 
both the short-term and long-term success of the constitution. The present 
difficulties of the new European Constitution indicate that lack of enthusiasm 
may result in the failure of the constitution-making exercise. 
 Now we have a sketch of how sentiments shape constitutions: public 
sentiments influence constitutional design directly in some of the cases, but 
more importantly, constitutional decisions operate with assumptions about the 
current sentiments and also contain assumptions about emotions that will be 
generated by the constitutional design. Much of the constitutional arrange-
ments is designed to predict, anticipate, and cope with what the drafters or 
judges imagine are popular sentiments.  
 To illustrate the complexity of the relation between sentiment and constitu-
tional design, I would like to discuss only the impact emotions have on modern 
democracies. This story indicates how difficult, perhaps impossible, it is to 
keep public sentiments within the boundaries of constitutionalism. I will discuss 
militant democracy that deals with the arguably illicit use of emotions in politics. 
 As mentioned above, fear dictates that post-totalitarian constitutions include 
provisions that enable preventive measures against anti-democratic movements 
and actions. This preventive repertoire is called militant democracy. The name 
comes from a 1937 article of the German émigré political scientist, Karl 
Loewenstein.9 He argued that democracies should not stick to formal liberal 
and democratic processes when fascists are abusing these processes.  
 According to Loewenstein, authoritarian regimes and movements are held 
together not by violence, but by emotionalism. This is what replaces the rule of 
law. Authoritarian regimes and fascist movements possess an arsenal of 
techniques for emotional mobilization. Nationalist fervor and intimidation, 
  
 9 Loewenstein, K.: Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights I., II., American 
Political Science Review, 31 (1937) 417, 638. 
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which is conjured up with the image of physical coercion, are the most com-
mon elements of political emotionalism. The only genuine goal of such politics 
is to seize and retain power at all costs. In this, movements may succeed even 
if they operate within the democratic institutional infrastructure. Loewenstein 
talks explicitly about the perfect adaptation of the politics of emotions to 
democracy. An example of this is when new elections or referenda are extorted 
by means of emotional mass politics, including threatening mass demonstra-
tions, strikes, etc., bordering on violence. It is not by accident that reputable 
democracies refrain from having national referenda, or limit the right to 
demonstrate. In direct decision-making methods, the politics of emotional 
manipulation and its momentary considerations prevail at the expense of the 
more or less rational problem-solving methods of constitutional institutions. 
Therefore, a constitutional democracy must be ready and able to confine the 
politics of emotions. 
 For militant democracy, decisions based on emotional impulses are suspect. 
Given the fear of the consequences of emotional politics, militant democracy 
becomes risk averse. This is in net opposition to freedom-maximizing constitu-
tionalism that stands for constitutional risk-taking. Risk aversion is troubling 
in a constitutional democracy that stands for liberty. Risk-taking is required 
for liberty, at least according to Justice Brandeis, who gave the following 
justification for not limiting freedom of speech: 
 
 “Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state 
was to make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its government 
the deliberative forces should prevail against the arbitrary. […] They believed 
[…] courage to be the secret of liberty […. and] that the greatest menace to 
freedom is an inert people.”  
 
Further, he referred to the negative consequences of preventive oppression: 
“fear breeds repression […], repression breeds hate.”10  
 Along these lines of risk-taking for liberty, Brandeis (referring to speech) 
suggested that the seriousness of the evil, the probability of occurrence, and 
the reasonableness of the assumption regarding the probability are to be taken 
into account. The problem is that fear and other emotions, and emotionally 
conditioned perceptions, undermine the probability calculus. 
 As mentioned above, if a society operates under the assumption of risk 
aversion in matters of political action, liberty-based reasoning is not attractive. 
The inclination to social risk aversion increases where specific historical 
  
 10 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 375. 
 CONSTITUTIONAL SENTIMENTS 11 
  
experiences dictate precaution; once again, constitutions may help to perpetuate 
past experiences of fear.  
 In order to counter the politics of emotion one has to rethink the basic risk-
taking position of liberty-enhancing constitutionalism. In practical terms, this 
means that, for example, the authorization of mass demonstrations requires a 
rethinking of arrangements that were considered to be settled under the liberty 
paradigm. See, for example the problems related to the authorization of anti-
globalization demonstrations, like the one at the G-8 Seattle meeting. Authorizing 
demonstrations remains a matter for constitutional rethinking, when certain 
groups make it clear that they cannot achieve their goals without seriously 
burdening other citizens and the public order. 
 President Franklin Roosevelt said that the only thing we have to fear is fear 
itself. The intellectual hero of the Hungarian anti-communist movement, István 
Bibó’s most often quoted line among dissidents was that “he who is afraid 
cannot be a good democrat.” But most political systems do not subscribe to 
this pathos. It remains part of the research agenda to determine to what extent 
and under which circumstances the fearlessness position make sense, in light 
of the decision-shaping capacities of emotions, including fear. 
 With increased social fear it is difficult to sustain institutionalized risk-taking. 
Here risk-taking, also known as liberty, is replaced with the precautionary 
principle.  
 The politics of emotion remains a fundamental challenge to deliberative 
democracy. Terrorism generates emotional reactions that may preclude reasonable 
reactions. Liberty is curtailed in panic, but such action might be justified by the 
dictates of sentiments.  
 The politics of emotion is with us even without terrorism. Ordinary electoral 
processes and referenda are fought and won by mobilizing emotions. Democracy 
understood as popular election is turned into a process of choosing leaders 
from the elite on the basis of unconscious preferences (hardly a robust 
republican theory). This clearly negates the fundamental assumption of consti-
tutional law that democracy is legitimated as a process that enables socially 
optimal decisions through participation and deliberation. The opportunities for 
reasonable arguments are further undermined by the prevailing culture of 
narcissism where victimhood and related suffering become trumps, especially 
where suffering is visualized enough to generate emotions, including indignation 
and sympathy. In this way, politics has become a beauty contest of public 
indignations. 
 Of course, the constitutional institutional design contains elements that are 
intended to diminish emotionalism and related populism. An important organi-
zational solution aims at insulating public institutions from the emotional public 
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process. Insulation means that social decisions are taken by experts, instead of 
being decided by politically accountable institutions or directly by the people. 
These allegedly neutral experts deliberate on the basis of allegedly professional 
considerations. Examples range from central banks to constitutional courts as 
policy makers.  
 The argument is that these professional bodies will be deliberative. However, 
given well-known organizational interests, actual partisan influences, bounded 
rationality, personal emotions within the organization unchecked by public 
scrutiny and accountability, and other trends like cascades, professional decision-
making might be as emotionally loaded as any plebiscite.  
 The ambivalent role of emotions in democracy is well illustrated in the current 
debate between Cass Sunstein of Chicago Law School and his critics regarding 
the proper handling of social risks. The debate centers on those public risks 
that are quintessential for constitutional law: terrorism, nuclear energy, global 
warming, etc. Sunstein claims that humans are irrational risk evaluators, partly 
because of affect that determines risk perception. Scientifically trained experts 
are less vulnerable to cognitive defects originating in emotional distortions. It 
thus makes sense to transfer decision-making in these areas to experts insulated 
from political processes.11 The opposite view was recently presented by Dan 
Kahan and co-authors. They point to the enormous discrepancies among experts 
in matters of risk perception. Increased government regulation that bypasses 
the democratic process shows shortcomings that are not that different from 
public democratic judgment. In particular, Dan Kahan and colleagues argue 
that the disagreements between lay and expert perceptions of risk are grounded 
on different value choices. These value choices are emotionally grounded, but 
emotions and values cluster in society, as they are culturally shaped. The Dan 
Kahan approach is based on the assumption that “culture is cognitively prior to 
facts in the sense that cultural values shape what individuals believe the 
consequences of such policies to be.”12  
 One cannot deny the existence of these cultural choices that serve for the 
emotional reactions regarding facts and assumptions. As Martha Nussbaum 
summarized it recently,13 emotions are not thoughtless surges of affect but 
value-laden judgments shaped by social norms. There is a place for democratic 
  
 11 See Sunstein, C.: Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle. Cambridge, 
2005. 
 12 Kahan, D. et al.: Fear and Democracy or Fear of Democracy? A Cultural Evaluation 
of Sunstein on Risk, Yale Law School Public Law Working Paper, (2005), 17–18. 
 13 Nussbaum, M.: Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. Cambridge, 
2001. 
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political choice that cannot be replaced by expert regulation; it is not an issue 
for expert knowledge which of the following dangers you prefer: gun-induced 
violence under a right to bear arms regime, or the anxiety and the danger of 
being left without personal self-defense in case guns are prohibited. 
 The above debate is decided partly on normative grounds, i.e., what follows 
from one or another theory of democracy and theory of the constitution. But 
the formation and acceptance of such theories depends on an underlying, 
emotionally shaped risk preference. It seems risky to leave vital matters to be 
decided by normative considerations only.  
 At this point, scientific knowledge regarding the impact of emotions becomes 
decisive. An informed theory of constitutional sentiments should provide enough 
knowledge to enable a critical approach to the assumptions about sentiments 
that prevail in constitutional choices. Are political and legal scholarship and 
practices going to use the lessons emerging from behavioral sciences? Law is 
an interest-driven practical activity. It is not out of the question that interests 
will prevail in law in disregard of improved knowledge about emotions. Or, 
perhaps a better understanding of emotions will only add to the repertoire of 
legal manipulation. Feminist and other scholars offered evidence regarding the 
role of emotions in legally relevant behavior, but the legal profession resisted 
the accommodation of that knowledge, because of mental rigidity and special 
interests of domination, among other reasons.  
 Lawyers and regulators may distort knowledge but this is not to say that the 
scholarly analysis of constitutional emotions lacks a proper subject.  
 These short remarks are certainly far from covering all the important 
relations between emotions and constitutional law. I hope, however, that this 
was sufficient to show that constitutional decisions and critical thinking about 
government requires the taking into consideration of public emotions. 
 
 
 
 
